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Abstract: Online services on the Internet are increasing day by day, and in parallel, the number of cyber-attacks is
rapidly increasing. These attacks are not always about data theft, but they can cause severe damage by denial of service
attacks. Intrusion Prevention System products that many organizations use at the border of their enterprise networks
are not strong enough to protect against DoS attacks. The typical way to mitigate such attacks is to get support from a
service provider. However, a service provider only provides solutions for the traffic originating from itself. If the source
of attack is in another ISP domain, it is possible to inform that ISP via phone or e-mail. As a result, the source of the
attack is blocked by the manual intervention of the service provider whose domain hosts it. Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) based solutions are also available for automating a blocking system, but not all enterprise networks support BGP.
In this research, we have developed a centralized automation solution for software defined network (SDN) environments
that is capable of preventing cyber-attacks at the source of attack. This solution does not require any BGP support.
Non-SDN environments can also use this attack mitigation and notification system. In the long run, we may use this
system to create a national protection shield in order to mitigate Cybersecurity attacks.
Key words: Denial of service, Cyber, Attack, Software defined network, Openflow, Flowspec

1. Introduction
With the increase of public and private sector services provided on the Internet, the availability of Internet
access has become even more critical. Global Internet access outages cause not only severe financial loss, but
also an interruption in public services such as health care, security, and justice systems. [1]
Besides, with the concept of ”Internet of Things” (IoT), services provided using the Internet have reached
a whole new level. With this new concept, we can create smart cities, intelligent buildings, and smart houses
with many physical and virtual devices connected to the Internet. In the long run, the number of such devices
will increase and we have to protect them from cybersecurity attacks. [2].
Today, cybersecurity threats are the most serious national security issue. “Cyber-attacks” and “Data
fraud or theft” are in the top risks list of the World Economy Forum’s 2018 report [3]. One of the most critical
cybersecurity threats is “Distributed Denial of Service” (DDoS) attacks which pose a severe threat to the existing
Internet infrastructure [4, 5]. Moreover, DDoS attacks can exhaust the network and computer resources almost
without any warning [6].
S. T. Zargar et al. classifies DDoS mitigation systems by location. The classes consist of Source-based
DDoS Defense Mechanisms (solution at the source of attack), Network-based DDoS Defense Mechanisms (at
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ISP network), Destination-based DDoS Defense Mechanisms (at victim’s site) [2]. Blocking volumetric DDoS
attacks at the border of a network (destination-based defense) cannot prevent the victim network’s service
outage. When bandwidth saturation occurs at the victim site, the attacker accomplishes its goal and the victim
service becomes unavailable.
ISPs mostly prefer proprietary solutions that cannot drop the attack traffic at the source. Such solutions
can mitigate attacks at the directly connected site (network-based defense). As a result, the attack traffic
continues to saturate the available bandwidth throughout the traffic path, and the network service may become
unavailable. In February 2016, an attack was detected on Turkey’s DNS servers. Since Turkish National
Research and Education Network Authority (ISP of the Turkish Universities, ULAKNET) dropped the attack,
the connection to its peer ISP continued to be saturated. Due to the saturated connection, the domain name
servers went out of service and “.tr” sites became inaccessible. This case has shown that individual responses
of the ISPs to such cyber-attacks remain inadequate.
Industry-standard mitigation solutions mostly use the BGP protocol (RFC3882, RFC5575, RFC5635).
With the BGP protocol, the victim site sends blocking requests to its peer ISP. Upon the receipt of such a
request, the network admin manually implements the BGP configuration. This blocking configuration is also
manually removed after the attack. However, not all the enterprise network authorities use BGP. Therefore, this
solution is not applicable to every network. They often communicate with the ISP via e-mail or telephone and
request a solution for DDoS mitigation. This process extends the response time before the actual intervention.
Even in the case that both the ISP and customer use BGP, the ISP cannot detect if the attack exists or
not and have to trust the customer’s request. With proprietary or BGP based solutions, ISPs can mitigate the
attacks, but there is no automatic mechanism to inform the attacker site. Thus, the source which was infected
by malware may continue to attack other sites.
Furthermore, these types of solutions mostly focus on DDoS attacks. Such systems do not block singlesource or low-volume attacks (mostly targeted applications such as SSH service). Moreover, the amount of these
kind of attacks cannot be neglected (see section 2). Since they could be dropped by an intrusion prevention
system (IPS) at the victim’s site. However in this case the system does not notify the source site and the attack
traffic continues.
In this research, we propose an inter-domain attack mitigating solution called Attack Blocking System
(ABS) that provides solutions to these problems. With this system, we can share cyber-attack information with
other network authorities, validate attack occurrence, inform the network authority which acts as the source of
attack, and drop the attack at the closest point to the source. This system can be used even for DDoS attacks
and low-volume application-centric attacks. There is no need to use the BGP protocol, and the system can
easily work with the Software Defined Network architecture.
2. Background and related work
DDoS protection systems are grouped into two categories: attack detection systems and attack mitigation
systems. There are several studies on these subjects. Most of these studies focused on a specific type of traffic.
Wang proposed a defense system for DNS infrastructure [7]. Singh et al. worked on HTTP-GET flood DDoS
attacks [8]. Kurt et al.’s study was about detecting SIP-based DDoS attacks [9]. Saravanan et al. worked on a
system for the detection of application layer DDoS attacks [10]. In addition, several studies have been conducted
in attack detection and mitigation techniques on fog [11, 12] and cloud computing [13, 14]. Agrawal et al. and
Bhushan et al. worked on low-rate DDoS attack in cloud computing environment [15, 16]. Besides there are
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studies on attack detection and prevention in 5G mobile networks [17–19]. Demir et al. proposed an intrusion
detection system by combining different classification models, but their study did not have a mitigation system
[20]. Patil et al. and Behal et al. worked on DDoS just for early detection [21, 22]. Previous studies have
almost exclusively focused on a specific traffic type or have only attack detection mechanism.
Today, the industry-standard mitigation infrastructures which target DDoS attacks work with the BGP
Protocol. One of them is the Destination-based Remotely Triggered Black Hole (D/RTBH) solution defined in
RFC 3882. In this system, the victim site makes a BGP announcement with community value 666 and triggers
the ISP to add a Black Hole route for its server’s IP address. The ISP drops the attack traffic, but this causes
a service outage. Only after the servers’ IP addresses and DNS record are changed, the server can continue its
service. This system requires preconfiguration of the discard route on all the edge routers.
Another mitigation solution that works with BGP is the Source-based Remotely Triggered Black Hole
(S/RTBH) solution defined in RFC 5635. It is a network-based solution which can stop the attack traffic at the
connected ISP, but not at the source of the attack. It requires configuration of the discard route and the source
address validation mechanism (Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding) on the edge routers.
Flowspec, which also requires BGP (RFC 5575), is an attack information sharing system between ISPs.
However, major ISPs do not prefer sharing these kinds of information with their competitors [23]. Sharing such
information is considered a privacy leakage [24]. This system can use access-list rules to drop the traffic and
can check if the source IP address is in the routing table or not. All these three solutions are network-based
defense mechanisms, and they do not inform the source of the attack. In addition, sites which are not using
BGP cannot use these techniques. You can find the differences between these industry-standard mitigation
techniques and Attack Blocking System (ABS) in Table 1.
Routers today mostly work as distributed devices and do not have a central decision-making mechanism.
One of the first studies that centralize this mechanism is the Route Control Platform (RCP) system that works
with BGP [25]. This system focuses on the BGP protocol to centralize forwarding and shorten the convergence
time. The OpenFlow protocol, developed later to centralize the network infrastructure, benefits from the existing
control plane (network application) and data plane (switching application) architectures of network devices [26].
Control plane operations use a general purpose CPU. The data plane has switching operations that are
carried out with ASICs. A new architecture called Software Defined Network (SDN) moves the control plane to
an external computer which is called ”controller”. The OpenFlow protocol transmits flow information between
network devices and this controller. OpenFlow controller software can handle multiple network devices. A
new plane called application plane is added for customizing the network decisions [27]. With the use of SDN,
management and monitoring have become much easier [28–30]. SDN also provides many advanced security
solutions [31].
This architecture can be used as an intrusion detection and mitigation solution. One of the studies with
SDN is STRIDE, an attack prevention system for DDoS, which operates by assigning trust values from clients’
network activity behaviors [32]. Moving Target Defense (MTD) is another OpenFlow (SDN) security solution,
which assigns random IP addresses to clients [33]. This system provides protection against reconnaissance
attacks. Giotis et al. worked on another security solution with SDN. It is a system that uses the advantages
of SDN for easy traffic management, monitoring and firewalling [34]. This system uses sFlow to detect and
mitigate the attack. Mantur at al. worked on developing a signature-based firewall and statistical-based
network intrusion detection system with the SDN infrastructure [35]. They built a centralized firewall and
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Table 1. Mitigation techniques
System
D/RTBH (RFC 3882)
S/RTBH (RFC 5635)
Flowspec (RFC 5575)
Wang [7]
Singh et al.[9]
Saravanan et al. [10]
Zhou et al. [11]
Priyadarshini et al. [12]
Yusop et al. [13]
Miao et al. [14]

Agrawal et al. [15]
Bhushan et al. [16]
Serrano et al. [17]
Sotelo et al. [18]
Serrano et al. [19]
[20],[21], [22]
[32–36]
Wang et al. [37]
Sahoo et al. [38]
Carvalho et al. [39]
Yuan et al. [40]
Wang et al.[41]
Sahay et al. [42]
ABS

No
No
No

Block at the
Attacker’s ISP
(at other AS)
No
No
Yes

Inform the
Attacker
Site
No
No
No

Verify Attack
Traffic at
Source
No
No
No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes (Also
works w/o SDN)

Yes

Yes

Yes

For all
Traffic Type

BGP
Independent

Works
with SDN

Yes
Yes
Yes
For DNS
Traffic Only
For SIP
Traffic Only
For Layer 7
Traffic Only
For Fog
Computing
Only
For Cloud
Computing
Only
For Low-rate
Traffic at
Cloud
Computing Only
For 5G
Mobile Networks
Only
For Detection
Only w/o SDN
For Detection
Only w/ SDN
Yes
(For low density)
For Data
Centers Only
For Cloud
Computing
Only
Yes

No
No
No

Yes

network intrusion detection system which works on the destination site. Joldzic et al. worked on a local DoS
detection method which provides scalability with balancing algorithms [36].
Wang et al. created a system called “Woodpecker” for detecting and mitigating low density link flooding
attacks via SDN [37]. Sahoo et al., Carvalho et al., and Yuan et al. also worked DDoS attack detection and
mitigation system for data centers with SDN [38–40]. Wang et al. studied on cloud computing DDoS attack
protection system with software defined networks [41]. ArOMA is a SDN based DDoS mitigation framework
[42]. ArOMA can mitigate the attack at the victim site and can also mitigate at the local ISP.
760

AKIN et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

All these security solutions are designed to mitigate mostly low rate or high rate DDoS attacks. Attacks
which do not try to denial a service, such as SSH login attempts, are not blocked by such systems. Local IDS
/ IPS systems can block SSH attempts, but the attack traffic reaches the entrance of the network. Besides, the
network administrators at the attacker’s site are not informed about this activity. If the source of the attack is
an infected PC with malware, it continues its activity. To get an idea of the volume of such attacks, we reviewed
all unauthorized ssh request attempts to a server on a Turkish University for 90 days(Jun 14th-Sep 11th, 2019)
which has a global SSH service enabled. You can find the details at Figure 1. In ninety days, attackers made
693,597 unauthorized SSH connection attempts. On average 7707 attempts have occured per day.
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0

Daily Attack

Avarage

Figure 1. Daily distribution of attacks.

3. Operation and structure of ABS (Attack Blocking System)
3.1. Goals of ABS
The primary objective of this research is to create a communication system between the network authority for
the attacker site and that for the victim site and inform these authorities after any detection of attack. With
this communication system, the authority for the source originating the attack is informed about the details of
the attack, and this authority, after verifying the issue, can drop the attack traffic at a point as close as possible
to the source. Unlike any other existing solution, ABS has the following features:
1. The proposed system works independently of any routing protocol. Yet, it can operate alongside any
routing protocol, like BGP, etc. That is to say, this system does not require BGP, but the routers that use
the BGP protocol can be beneficial in certain aspects. Global AS (Autonomous System) numbers can be
used to identify a network authority. Private AS numbers can also be used for the same purpose instead
of globally registered AS numbers. The details are provided in Section 4.
2. The attack can be stopped at the source, not at the service provider’s network. Unlike the popular
technique “Source-based Remotely Triggered Black Hole” (which adds a black hole (Null 0) route to layer
3 devices and drops the victim’s server traffic), ABS ensures that the server continues its operation.
3. ABS has a trust level mechanism. With the trust level mechanism, even if the system does not confirm
a full-trust relationship between the victim and the attacking site, it still informs the attacker site with
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the details of the attack traffic. Hence, the attacker site’s ABS can warn the IT staff on a dashboard, via
SMS or e-mail.
4. If we integrate this system with the SDN, it can detect whether there is an actual attack or not. After
receiving an attack notification, the ABS can block the attack traffic with the help of the SDN controller.
This system can also keep monitoring to verify if the threat continues. Once it is confirmed that there is
no threat, the system can automatically remove the blocking rules.
5. With the current solutions, the attack information sharing occurs between the enterprise network and its
peer ISP with the help of BGP. A victim enterprise network which does not use BGP may not be part of
any attack mitigation system currently in use. ABS does not require BGP, and any system can be part
of this notification network.
6. Even if an ISP does not join ABS, corporate networks can still be part of this system. The victim site
can send alerts to other corporate network authorities if they are identified as a source of attack traffic.
The ISP’s not being part of the detection and blocking process saves its resources in terms of time and
workload.
7. This remote warning system can help reduce future attacks. ABS sends attack information to the enterprise
network administrators of the attacker site and informs about the attacker PC which is possibly infected
by malware. They can take necessary precautions to make sure that the computers are clean before they
are permitted to reaccess the network. In the long run, this system can help to reduce the size of botnets.
8. Existing attack mitigation systems mostly provide solutions to DDoS attacks. We can also use ABS for
single-source attack attempts (e.g. SSH easy password attacks). Even if the system admins are not sure
if it is an attack or not, with the help of the ABS they can send notifications like ”possible attack” to
inform the peer ABS.
9. Since the system is very transparent to current network infrastructure, it is suitable for closed network
systems like military networks as well.
10. With ABS, attack prevention will no longer be only the ISPs’ responsibility. Any network authority can
provide feedback to cybersecurity teams.
3.2. Operation and structure of ABS
The ABS attack control system has two goals. The first one is to inform the source of the attack from the
victim system. The second goal of the project is to stop this attack at the nearest point to the attacker site.
ABS is not an intrusion detection system. It is a distributed attack notification and prevention system. There
are many studies and solutions on attack detection with SDN [43]. We can integrate ABS software into an
existing intrusion detection system (IDS) such as Snort [44]. ABS can also get information from a honeypot
system [45, 46].
With the SDN infrastructure, it is also easy to track packet statistics and detect any anomaly. IDS can
use this information to detect attacks and share attack details with the ABS. Thus, if we use ABS in conjunction
with SDN, we can get more benefits.
ABS can collect attack information from systems like IDS or Honeypot via an API. The attack information
collected by the network administrator can also be specified manually in the system by a custom GUI. In this
research, we examined how to prevent those attacks that are manually defined by network admins.
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We primarily focused on using ABS software with Software Defined Network infrastructure. Our software
is designed to receive related information from the SDN controllers and issue blocking orders. ABS can work
with multiple SDN controllers. In other words, an institution may have an ABS with multiple SDN controllers
connected to it (Centralized design, Figure 2). This model is most suitable for campus networks.
SAME AS

ABS COMMUNICATION

ATTACK BLOCKING
SYSTEM1 (ABS)

ATTACK BLOCKING
SYSTEM2 (ABS)

ATTACK BLOCKING SYSTEM (ABS )
REST API

REST API

SDN
CONTROLLER

SDN
CONTROLLER

SDN
CONTROLLER

SDN
CONTROLLER

OPENFLOW

OPENFLOW

SDN
SWITCHES

SDN
SWITCHES
CENTRALIZED DESIGN

SDN
SWITCHES

SDN
SWITCHES

DISTRIBUTED DESIGN

Figure 2. Centralized and distributed design.

It is also possible to have more than one ABS within the same institution or under the same AS. ISPs
could prefer this sort of design (Distributed design, Figure 2).
There are four different communication channels in the ABS. The first communication channel is between
the ABS software and the system which provides the attack information (IDS, a honeypot or local admin’s
manual entry, shown as (1) in Figure 3). This channel is for getting the local attack information to local ABS.
The second channel is for communication between two ABS software. After the system receives the attack
information, communication starts between ABS systems and local ABS sends attack information to the remote
ABS. Details of this communication are given in chapter 4 (Shown as (2) in Figure 3).
Then the remote ABS can verify this attack information with the SDN integrated architecture in the
third communication channel. For this purpose, the attack traffic flow is added to the SDN switch by the SDN
controller to trace the attack traffic (Figure 4). We use REST API for this communication shown as (3) in
Figure 3. In other words, this third communication is between the ABS software and the SDN controller. Later
on, the SDN controller collects statistical information related to this flow. If there is matching traffic with the
attack flow, the system concludes that the attack continues.
The fourth and the last communication channel uses OpenFlow protocol between the SDN controller and
the SDN switch. Even OpenFlow v1.0 is sufficient for this communication channel (Shown as (4) in Figure 3).
Once the system confirms the attack and if the ABS peers form “notification only relationship”, the
attacker site’s ABS only informs the local network admin. If ABS peers have built “full-trust relationship”,
ABS informs the local network admin and blocks the attack traffic. Then the attacker site’s ABS informs the
victim site’s ABS about the process.
Another important point is to remove this blocking rule after the attack is over. The network admin can
remove this blocking rule manually. However, with an SDN-integrated ABS, the system can follow the matching
packet traffic statistics from the SDN switch at a specific frequency. Blocking remains as the number of attacking
packets continues to increase. If the number of packets for that flow does not increase, it automatically removes
the block after a predefined expiration period. With this feature, ABS does not leave any forgotten drop rules.
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Inter ABS
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OPENFLOW
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Openﬂow (4)
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Figure 3. Communication channels in the ABS.
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action
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1
4
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SDN Cont.

Returns traﬀic statistics

SDN SWITCH

2
3

Returns traﬀic statistics

Figure 4. Attack verification.

We can use ABS in a non-SDN system. When it is configured in a non-SDN environment, attack traffic
can be manually blocked without verifying the attack. In both cases, the attacker site’s network administrator
can be aware of the attack and can identify the attacker device. The network admin examines the attacker PC
and removes the malware if it is infected. In addition to this, ABS can block attacks with the help of S/RTBH,
D/RTBH or Flowspec techniques. However, this requires BGP running systems and pre-configuration of edge
routers. In some scenarios, both parties may be an enterprise network which does not use BGP. With ABS, it
is not necessary to get support from an ISP. The network authority can take action manually, or if they have
an SDN-integrated ABS, it can prevent the attack automatically.
4. Design details of ABS
4.1. System configuration process
Step 1: Basic configuration of ABS system
In an infrastructure with SDN architecture, the SDN controller can block the attack automatically. If the
system does not have an infrastructure with SDN architecture, we specify this in the ABS software as a legacy
network. The system can then only send notifications instead of blocking. This notification can be configured
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to alert network admins via e-mail, SMS, or similar systems like notification dashboards. In this research, we
focused mostly on SDN-based attack blocking systems.
In case the SDN-based blocking system is selected, we have defined the details of the SDN controllers
in the ABS (IP address and TCP port number of the SDN Controller). Optionally, security credentials can
be applied to enable secure communication with the controller and we define IP prefixes that are under the
management of the configured controller. After this phase, the ABS can receive data from the controllers and
send a blocking request through the REST API.
The system can also be configured to manage multiple SDN controllers within the same organization
with a single ABS (Centralized Design). This means multiple SDN controllers can be added to a single ABS
server.
Step 2: Defining other ABS systems
We have configured the local ABS with the IP addresses, security credentials, trust levels of peer ABS
systems, and blocking mechanisms agreed between peers. A certification-based authentication can be used for
the local ABS. There are two trust levels in the system. The first one is the “notification only relationship”
which only notifies the peer network authority when an attack alert is received, and the second one is the “fulltrust relationship” which does not only notify the neighbor ABS but also enables the peer ABS to block the
attack at the source. In this sense, the process of authentication of the ABS systems is highly critical because
a rogue request from an unauthorized source can block the legitimate traffic. We recommend using out-ofband communication between ABS systems where communication is critical. Thus, the network communication
between the ABS peers does not have to be affected by security issues or high-volume DDoS attacks.
Another information required by the system is the networks/prefixes that are under the management of
the peer ABS systems. IP prefix definition can be done with various methods and is a very critical process. An
ABS should not issue a blocking order for unauthorized IP prefixes.
The most secure method is manual definition by the local admin of the prefixes that are under the control
of other peer ABS systems. Alternatively, each ABS can teach its authorized prefixes to its peer ABS systems.
In both cases, ABS can check this information from the global BGP tables for control purposes. However, there
cannot be such control if the organization is not using BGP. In this case, the values entered by the authorized
persons have to be trusted. Once the ABS peers complete their mutual information exchange, they form a
neighborship.
From now on, if ABS detects an attack from a peer prefix which belongs to a peer ABS server, the system
can now notify the peer ABS of the attack. The notification message sent to the ABS peer should include
the attacker’s source IP address, destination IP addresses and message type. We can also include the protocol
number, source and destination port numbers in the message. With these details, the remote ABS device can
drop the flow more precisely compared to the case where only the IP addresses are used.
In this research, we have used three different message types and additional subcodes in the ABS. The
message type and code sections use 4 bytes in total. The first message type is for the ”hello” communication
used for establishing the neighborship between the ABS systems. Hello messages also control the communication
status between them. This message type is defined as Type 0 and has two codes. Code 0.1 is a “hello packet”
and Code 0.2 is an “ack packet”.
The second message type is defined as Type 1 and has two codes. ABS sends Type 1 messages in case
of an attack. Code 1.1 is an “intrusion prevention request” message. Code 1.2 is an “intrusion notification”
message sent in case of ABS peers which has formed a ”Notification Only Relationship”. The last message type
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is defined as Type 2 and has four codes. ABS sends Type 2 messages for reply purposes. These are “request
confirmed” and “request rejected” packets. You can find message details in Figure 5. In further studies, we can
add more message types and code numbers if required.

TYPE 1 (Request)
Code 1.1: Intrusion prevention request
Code 1.2: Intrusion notification

Victim
site

TYPE 2 (Reply)
Code 2.1: Request confirmed
Code 2.2: Request rejected, unknown
source IP range
Code 2.3: Request rejected, no attack
detected
Code 2.4: Request rejected, no full
trust neighborship

Attacking
site

Figure 5. Message types used for communication between ABS servers.

4.2. Flowcharts of the system and software components
The ABS software has 3 different modules for mitigating attacks. First one is the ”Attacker Location Identification” module represented with (1) as shown in Figures 6 and 7. This module works after the attack information
is received and identifies which ABS the attacker computer belongs to. If the module detects that the source
of the attack is a device under the authority of its own ABS, it stops the attack with the help of module two
without communicating with the other ABS systems. If the source IP of the attack is not associated with any
ABS, the system creates a log and notifies the local system admin.
If the attack traffic comes from a peer ABS, it triggers the second module. The second module of the
system is called ”Communication Between ABS Peers”. This module is responsible for the communication
between the ABS systems as defined in Figures 6 and 7. Module two establishes a neighborship between the
ABS peers. After this phase of neighborship establishment, each site periodically sends hello packets within the
hello interval to verify that the peer ABS is alive. If no hello packet arrives within the hold time interval, the
local ABS determines that the communication with the peer ABS has been lost and sends a notification to the
system admin. In that case, the ABS falls back to the phase of neighborship establishment.
The other task of the second module is to inform a peer ABS that it has an attacking computer (Figure 6).
When the ABS sends an attack notification message to a peer ABS, the peer replies with an ack message and
confirms receipt of the attack information. In that phase, it compares its IP prefixes with the attacker’s IP
address. (Figure 7) If they do not match, the peer system sends a Code2.2: error message “Request rejected,
unknown source IP Range”. If the attacker’s IP address matches the peer systems’ IP range, module 3 performs
an attack verification. At this step, the current traffic flow is checked to see if there is such traffic defined from
the victim ABS. The name of this third module is ”Attack Verification and Blocking System”.
In Module 3, the ABS sends related flow information with FORWARD action to the SDN Controller,
and SDN Controller adds this flow to the switch. Then the packet number of this flow is checked to see whether
it is increasing or not. If the relevant traffic does not match the added flow, the local ABS sends a Code 2.3
error message (Request rejected, no attack detected) to the victim ABS. If the traffic matches the flow, the
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Flow Chart at the Victim SDN Site
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Figure 7. Flow chart at the attacker site.

As indicated in Table 1, the only technique that operates multidomain as well as ABS is BGP/Flowspec.
We compared the two techniques in order to obtain performance values. Since Flowspec only works on carrier
grade routers, we got support from a national ISP to build the test environment. In the GNS3 emulation
environment, we created an testbed with a Cisco ASR9K series router and a Nokia 7750 series router. Both
systems were implemented between two directly connected domains. According to the measurements in the test
environment, the attack blocking durations are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Attack blocking durations (The average of ten trials)

System
Flowspec
ABS

Requires
BGP
Yes
No

Blocking
duration
0,547 Sec
0,051 Sec

Blocking attack traffic
with attack verification
No
0,111 Sec

Remove blocking rule by verifying
that attack traffic stopped
No
0,110 Sec

Flowspec is a feature added to the BGP protocol. The main purpose of the BGP protocol is to create
global routing tables. For stability purposes, BGP has to wait for advertising timers to expire before making a
new advertisement. This occurs 30 seconds after the last advertisement in the eBGP protocol (RFC4271). We
changed this timer to zero for a fair comparison. Since the Flowspec does not support “Blocking attack traffic
with attack verification” and “Remove blocking rule by verifying that attack traffic stopped” features, relevant
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values could not be measured. The ABS system which we developed in Python accomplished the following goals
in our testbed:
• The victim site was able to send attack notifications to the attack sources.
• Attacker sites were able to validate the specified attack information from the OVS.
• Attacker site which has full-trust ABS relationship have completely stopped the attack. Other attack site
which does not have full-trust ABS relationship, only notified the network admins from the dashboard.
• The system monitored the attack traffic and automatically deactivated the blocking rules when the attack
stopped.
• The system worked independently from ISP and BGP as intended.
5. Conclusions and Discussion
In conclusion, with the ABS, ISPs and enterprise network administrators can now directly be involved in the
detection and prevention of global cyber-attacks. This system can verify and block the attack with the help of
the SDN architecture. In addition, these kinds of systems can help spread the use of SDN. Even if the system is
not using SDN, this system provides a global attack information environment between network administrators.
This feature is even more important.
The ABS aims to block the data traffic of attacking computers and minimize the effects of DDoS attacks
on the victim system. Most of the time, a malicious code causes this kind of attacks. For example, if malware
infects a PC, IPS and IDS systems do not concentrate on cleaning it, they only try to block its traffic. As more
ISPs and corporate networks join the ABS infrastructure, more malware-infected computers can be detected.
Therefore, this system also helps reduce the number of botnet members.
In the case of NAT, the system administrator can only access the public IP address information used
by the attacking PC. Even in this case, this system can block attacks using the attacker’s public IP address
and port number. We can also check NAT translation tables to determine the attacker PC. In future studies, a
module can be developed that integrates NAT translation tables into this system. The same problem does not
occur on systems that use public IP addresses. With IPv6 migration, this situation will be eliminated.
Neighborship between the ABS systems must be full mesh. In the case of a large number of installations,
ABS can cause problems due to the large volume of neighborships. For example, if we install this system for
100 network authorities, 4950 ABS neighborships are required. Later studies can focus on implementation of
designated trust points for scalability purposes. With this feature, any ABS can be registered as this designated
ABS only.
In this study, we have implemented an attack verification and blocking system with SDN or manual
intervention. Future studies can add DDoS attack mitigation techniques, such as S/RTBH, D/RTBH or
Flowspec, to the ABS.
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